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INTRODUCTION
Customary international law is being reevaluated by scholars who
have questioned both its status with respect to federal law and its
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theoretical underpinnings. This in turn has led to a lively debate between
these scholars and others who defend the more traditional view.' Such a
debate is appropriate, given that relations among nation-states and other
international actors have become more integrated and complex and as a
result, issues of international governance have become increasingly im-
portant. One of the debate's core issues is the question of what exactly
are the nature and role of international law and of customary interna-
tional law in particular, within this environment?
In a pair of recent articles, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Pos-
ner have used game theoretic principles to challenge the positivist
account of customary international law.2 Their writings join other early
attempts to apply game theory to the international law sources.3 I have
two purposes in this Article. The first is to evaluate game theory's poten-
tial for yielding greater insight into customary international law and
international law more generally. The second is to respond to the conclu-
sions about customary international law drawn by Professors Goldsmith
and Posner.
In Part I, I discuss the approach proposed by these two scholars.
Traditionally, customary international law is understood as a general and
consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
In Professors Goldsmith and Posner's view, game theoretic principles
suggest that customary norms are in fact the result of self-interested
states acting in various strategic situations. They argue that three major
conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, states do not comply
with customary international law out of a sense of legal obligation-they
act out of their rational self-interest in their interactions with other states.
Second, customary norms do not reflect a single unitary logic. Third,
they are skeptical that regularities in behavior among states that consti-
tute a general and consistent practice exist. Such considerations lead
I. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1993);
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
2. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REv. 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Theory]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Un-
derstanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000) [hereinafter Modern and Traditional Customary International
Law].
3. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements:
Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301 (1990) (dis-
cussing trade agreements as noncooperative games); John Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 139 (1996) (applying game theory to the international law of treaties); FERNANDO
R. Ts6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-103 (1998) (discussing the relationship
between international law, game theory and ethics).
f[Vol. 23:143
Game Theory and Customary International Law
Professors Goldsmith and Posner to doubt the robustness of customary
international law.
Professors Goldsmith and Posner's contribution is an important one.
However, I draw different conclusions from the application of game the-
ory to customary international law. In Part 1I, 1 put Professors Goldsmith
and Posner's descriptive theory into some perspective by exploring
whether the purported failure of customary international law to describe
state behavior impacts the ability to use that law, first, as a tool for influ-
encing state behavior, and second, as a source of rules of decision. First,
with respect to influencing state behavior, I argue that the implications
for a game theoretic critique extend to both custom and treaties-game
theory appears to imply that in the final instance, neither source of law
can be relied on to influence state behavior when interests change. How-
ever, even if this is true, international law can continue to be used
instrumentally to enhance international cooperation when desired. Addi-
tionally, game theory explains why states cooperate or do not, but it does
not explain anything new about the scope of the problem of international
cooperation. Whether we feel confident in using custom or treaties to
influence behavior depends on our assessment of the level of compliance
with legal norms.
Second, with respect to the use of customary international law as a
source of rules of decision, I argue that there is a sense in which a de-
scriptive critique is inapposite because rules of law are used primarily to
evaluate behavior, not describe it. However, if there is a broad mismatch
between how states actually behave and how that behavior is evaluated,
this raises questions about the legitimacy of that evaluation. In this re-
gard, I argue that game theory has nothing to say about whether
customary international law is a valid theory of law. At the same time, a
broad mismatch would cause questions as to the value of such a theory.
In Part lII, I argue that there is a sufficient amount of "true" coopera-
tion among states to be construed as general and consistent state
practices. First, game theoretic principles that model a preference for
cooperation should apply to the formation of both customary norms and
treaties. In contrast, Professors Goldsmith and Posner's applications of
game theoretic models yield relatively low levels of cooperation among
states. Unless those applications are modified, they do not account for
the plethora of international treaties, which evidences relatively high lev-
els of cooperation. Once such modifications are allowed, it is unclear
why they should not apply to state interactions that do not result in
treaties. Second, treating customary international law and treaties to-
gether is more consistent with the ways in which customary international
law and treaties interact as sources of law. Since one source of law can
Fall 2001 ]
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give rise to the other, both can be seen as manifestations of true coopera-
tion among states. Third, there are game theoretic models that can
account for such cooperation.
In Part IV, I examine the concept of opinio juris. I argue that recent
game theoretic models of pro-social behaviors, in particular, strong re-
ciprocity, are consistent with a strict concept of legal obligation that
requires that at times persons who would prefer to defect will neverthe-
less cooperate. Because such models are just being developed, my
arguments in this Part are tentative. Even so, such models indicate that it
is too early to conclude from a game theoretic perspective that states
never act out of a sense of legal obligation. Finally, in Part V, I discuss
directions for further research.4
I. A NEW THEORY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Traditional Approach
Professors Goldsmith and Posner suggest that game theoretic princi-
ples can be used to break through impasses that frustrate customary
international law theory. Customary international law consists of general
and consistent state practices followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
The theoretical problems raised by customary international law are
widely recognized. What level of general practice is required before a
customary norm is established? How long must states follow a particular
practice before it becomes a legally binding norm? How does a sense of
legal obligation arise in the first place and what evidences it? If a cus-
tomary norm by definition requires a sense of legal obligation, how do
customary norms evolve, since to depart from a rule would violate it?'
Professors Goldsmith and Posner focus on two sets of issues crucial
to the traditional understanding of customary international law. First,
there is a set of "unarticulated assumptions" that underlie the traditional
approach. According to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, supporters of
the traditional approach understand customary international law as uni-
tary, universal, and exogenous.6 Specifically, customary international law
is unitary since all state actions included have the same "logical form."
4. A thorough treatment of the issues discussed in this Article requires more rigorous
mathematical modeling, which is not done here. Many of the sources I use here do provide
mathematical support for their findings, which of course can be reviewed by the interested
reader.
5. See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1998); MI-
CHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999).
6. Theory, supra note 2, at 1118-19.
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In addition, customary international law is also universal since it binds
all states except those who persistently object to it during its formation.
Finally, customary international law is exogenous in the sense that it is
an external force that influences state behavior.
Second, Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that the traditional
understanding of customary international law cannot explain interna-
tional behavior. For them, "the traditional account cannot explain why
[customary international law] changes in response to shifts in the relative
power of nations, advances in technology, and other exogenous forces."7
In fact, customary international law does not explain why nations fre-
quently change their views about the content of customary international
law, why national courts and politicians tend to articulate customary
norms in self-serving ways, why states say one thing and do another,
and, perhaps most importantly, why nations obey customary interna-
tional law.8
B. Game Theory and Customary
International Law
Professors Goldsmith and Posner suggest that new insight can be
gained by identifying those situations in which behavioral regularities
among states arise. In their view, instead of a set of rules established by a
general and consistent practice followed out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion, customary international law actually refers to behavioral
regularities that emerge out of self-interested state interactions in various
strategic settings. There are four basic situations that give rise to such
regularities: coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordina-
tion.
Coincidence of interest occurs "where states engage in behavioral
regularities simply because each obtains private advantages from a par-
ticular action (which happens to be the same action taken by the other
state) irrespective of the action of the other."9 Using an illustration drawn
from the Paquete Habana decision, '° Professors Goldsmith and Posner
posit a situation in which each of two belligerent states that patrol the
same body of water can choose between attacking or ignoring commer-
cial fishing vessels of the other state. Under certain conditions, it is
simply more beneficial for each state, acting without regard to the other,
to ignore the other state's fishing boats than it is to attack them. The
7. Id. at 1119.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1122.
10. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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payoff for ignoring the other's boats is higher than it is for attacking,'
and the fact that the two states refrain from attack is coincidental. "[T]he
outcome is no more surprising than the fact that states do not sink their
own ships."2
Coercion happens when "[o]ne state, or a coalition of states with
convergent interests, forces other states to engage in actions that serve
the interest of the first state or states."'' 3 A powerful state could threaten
to destroy a weaker state's navy if it attacks the stronger state's fishing
boats. The stronger state could do this if the costs of carrying out the
threat are relatively low. The weaker state, realizing that its payoff for
attacking the stronger state's boats is very low, will not do so. If the
stronger state has a better use for its navy, it too will refrain from attack-
ing the weaker state's boats.' 4 Again, regularity in behavior is explained
not by a general rule but by states responding rationally to a given strate-
gic situation.
Cooperation arises when states find themselves in a bilateral re-
peated prisoner's dilemma. 5 The logic of the prisoner's dilemma is such
that it would be mutually beneficial if two states in such a dilemma co-
operate, but if the game is played only once, the only "rational" thing to
do is to defect. Over repeated interactions, though, states realize that it is
more beneficial to cooperate so long as the other does not defect. How-
ever, several conditions must be met. First, both parties must care about
the future-that is, they must both be willing to defer a present payoff
for future gains."' Second, the states must believe that they will continue
to encounter each other for the foreseeable future. Finally, the payoffs
for defection must not be too high relative to the payoffs for coopera-
tion. " Because of these conditions, Professors Goldsmith and Posner
believe that behavioral regularity among states through cooperation is
less likely to arise than through coincidence of interest or coercion. Nev-
II. Theory, supra note 2, at 1122-23.
12. Id. at 1123.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1124.
15. Id. at 1125-26. See also infra text accompanying notes 83-85. The prisoner's di-
lemma is well known. Two prisoners are accused of committing the same crime. The
prosecutor, examining each suspect separately, gives each two choices, to deny guilt or to
confess. If both prisoners deny guilt, each goes free. If both confess, both will be imprisoned
for three years. If one confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses will go free and
receive a reward and the one who denies guilt will be imprisoned for six years.
It would be better for both prisoners if both denied guilt. However, each prisoner is afraid
of being caught in a situation in which he denies guilt and the other confesses. So the only
rational choice for each player is to confess.
16. This means that the future discount must be low.
17. Theory, supra note 2, at 1126.
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coercion. Nevertheless, when such conditions exist, true cooperation
among states does occur."
Finally, coordination between states can arise when "each state's
best move depends on the move of the other state."' 9 In this situation,
state 1 prefers to take action X if state 2 takes action X, and state 1 pre-
fers to take action Y if state 2 takes action Y. The problem, however, is
that there must be some way of knowing or communicating in advance
what each state will do to make coordination possible; otherwise, the
states must choose based on the some guess as to what the other will do.
Since, in Professors Goldsmith and Posner's view, most behavioral
regularity among states can be explained as self-interested responses in
one or more of these four types of games, it is no longer necessary to
posit a universal customary norm that explains such behavior. Their the-
ory "suggests that many apparently cooperative universal behavioral
regularities are illusory.' 20 Indeed, even though cooperation can result
from players that find themselves in a repeated prisoner's dilemma or
coordination game, Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that on the
international level, cooperation in these situations is probably rare. This
is partly due to the fact that universality implies a large number of actors.
In the case of the n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma, however, the
game eventually raises public goods or tragedy of the commons prob-
lems: despite cooperation among large numbers of players, one will
always find it advantageous to defect or freeride. In the case of coordina-
tion, the sheer number of players makes such coordination very difficult.
Given these problems, Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that to the
18. id. at 1127. For purposes of this Article, I will use "true" cooperation to refer to in-
stances of behavioral regularities that are not merely the products of coincidence of interest or
of coercion. More positively, it is a decision that it is preferable to cooperate with or coordi-
nate one's strategy with another's.
19. Id. Coordination games take several forms, but the most common example used in
game theory is the so-called battle of the sexes. A couple is deciding what to do for the eve-
ning. One prefers going to the opera, the other watching football, but each would rather spend
time with the other than go to the opera or watch football alone. Under these circumstances, it
would be best for both parties if both chose opera or both chose football. However, arriving at
this outcome depends on the ability of each individual to communicate his or her intention to
cooperate with the other. Alternatively, if such communication is not possible, each party is
better off choosing based on the probability that the other party will choose a particular
activity. For an introduction to coordination games and a discussion of recent experiments
with them, see RUSSELL W. COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES: COMPLEMENTARITIES AND
MACROECONOMICS viii-xiii, 1-17 (1999).
Note that both the prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes require cooperation be-
tween the players to arrive at the best solution for both of them. However, in the prisoner's
dilemma, there is only one such solution (cooperate), but in the battle of the sexes, there is
more than one optimal solution. In this Article, I will use cooperation to refer to cooperation in
both prisoner's dilemma and coordination games, but will use coordination only to refer to
cooperation in coordination games.
20. Theory, supra note 2, at 1129.
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extent that there is cooperation among states, it is more often accom-
plished through treaties. Most behavioral regularity among states that
purports to serve as a basis for customary norms can be explained by
21coincidence of interest or coercion.
Professors Goldsmith and Posner also argue that in none of these in-
stances does a state act out of a sense of legal obligation. It acts to serve
its own national interest . This self-interest results in shifts, sometimes
rapid, in customary norms. Customary norms form and change when
either the rules of the game or its payoffs change.22 In the case of coinci-
dence of interest, such interests change when the environment changes.
In the case of coercion, change occurs when a state is no longer more
powerful than the other. In the case of regularities arising out of a re-
peated prisoner's dilemma, what begins as behavior stemming from pure
coincidence of interest can develop into true cooperation even when
payoffs change. In the case of coordination games, customary norms can
arise and change through trial and error.23
As support for their theory, Professors Goldsmith and Posner exam-
ine specific areas where customary international law is thought to be
robust: neutrality, diplomatic immunity, maritime jurisdiction, and the
protection of coastal fishing vessels.24 In each case, they argue that the
record of actual state behavior is better explained by self-interested re-
sponses to specific strategic situations than by exogenous customary
international norms. For example, in the area of neutrality, Professors
Goldsmith and Posner trace state compliance with the principle of free
ships, free goods.25 They note that although early in its history, the
United States proclaimed its adherence to the principle, it quickly de-
21. They argue, "many of the behavioral regularities called [customary international law]
do not reflect meaningful international cooperation, but rather reflect coincidence of interest
or coercion, both of which lack normative support." Modern and Traditional Customary Inter-
national Law, supra note 2, at 671-72.
22. To illustrate, Professors Goldsmith and Posner return to the fishing boats discussed
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. There, two states initially decide not to
attack each other's boats through coincidence of interest. Even though payoffs change such
that it is now beneficial for each state to attack, the states might still refrain because not at-
tacking has become a focal point that is a possible desirable strategy for states. See Theory,
supra note 2, at 1133-34. (For more discussion of focal points, see infra text accompanying
notes 33-35.) Alternatively, in the case where states start with a policy of attacking boats, if
circumstances change so that it is no longer worth attacking boats, one state can announce that
it will no longer attack. If the other state knows the announcing state's payoffs for not attack-
ing, it might decide to "trust" the statement and stop its attacks as well. Id. at 1134.
23. To return to the battle of the sexes, supra note 19, after a series of unenjoyable eve-
nings alone, one will give up and go to the opera, or perhaps the couple will take turns.
24. Theory, supra 2, at 1139-67 (discussing neutrality, diplomatic immunity, and mari-
time jurisdiction); Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, supra note 2,
(discussing coastal fishing vessels).
25. Theory, supra note 2, at 1139-51.
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parted from it during the Civil War by broadly expanding the concepts of
blockade and continuous voyage.26 During the Spanish-American War,
Spain upheld the principle, not so much because it was a legal norm,
27"but rather because it lacked the naval capacity" to violate the norm.
Britain during the Boer War, and Russia during the Russo-Japanese War,
eventually complied with the principle, but only after receiving threats
from other countries. States were never able to agree to the principle dur-
ing treaty negotiations at the beginning of the 1900's, and the principle
eventually disappeared during the First World War. For Professors Gold-
smith and Posner, examples like this show how changes in state behavior
are better explained by shifting interests than by customary norms and
28exceptions to those norms. In short, "nations mouth their agreement to
popular ideals as long as there is no cost in doing so, but abandon their
commitments as soon as there is a pressing military or economic or do-
mestic reason to do So"
29
II. GAME THEORY AND THE ROBUSTNESS
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Professors Goldsmith and Posner's theory is intended to provide an
alternative account of customary international law. The explanatory
power of that theory leads them to question the robustness of custom as
it has traditionally been understood.30 Theirs is primarily a descriptive
project: if they are right, there are relatively few general and consistent
behaviors among states, none of which is motivated by a sense of legal
obligation. Therefore, they hold it is inaccurate as a descriptive matter to
speak as if such behaviors exist. I evaluate these descriptive claims in
Parts III and IV, but in this Part, I examine the significance of Professors
Goldsmith and Posner's critique for two other important uses of custom-
ary international law. If customary international law does in fact fail to
describe state behavior, in what ways, if any, does that impact our ability
to use customary international law, first, as a tool for influencing state
behavior, and second, as a source of rules of decision? I also examine
26. Id. at 1140-43.
27. Id. at 1144.
28. Professors Goldsmith and Posner reach similar conclusions with respect to diplo-
matic immunity and maritime jurisdiction. In addition, Professors Goldsmith and Posner
argue that diplomatic immunity is a good example of behavioral regularities that can arise
from the repeated bilateral prisoner's dilemma. See id. at 1153-55. See also Modern and
Traditional Customary International Law, supra note 2, at 642-54 (discussing state practice
with regard to enemy coastal fishing vessels).
29. Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, supra note 2, at 672.
30. Theory, supra note 2, at 1121.
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the implications of the answers to these questions for custom as a theory
of law.
With respect to influencing state behavior, the implications for a
game theoretic critique extend to both custom and treaties-game theory
appears to imply that in the final instance, neither source of law can be
relied on to influence state behavior when interests change. International
law can nevertheless continue to be used instrumentally to enhance in-
ternational cooperation when desired. Additionally, game theory explains
why states cooperate or not, but reveals nothing new about the scope of
the problem of international cooperation. Thus, whether policymakers
feel confident using custom or treaties to influence behavior depends
more on their assessment of states' levels of compliance with legal
norms.
With respect to the use of customary international law as a source of
rules of decision, there is a sense in which a descriptive critique is inap-
posite, because rules of law are used primarily to evaluate behavior, not
describe it. If there is a broad mismatch between how states actually be-
have and how that behavior is evaluated, however, questions arise about
the legitimacy of the evaluation. Game theory has nothing to say about
whether customary international law is a valid theory of law. Again,
however, a broad mismatch would cause us to question the value of such
a theory.'
A. Customary International Law as a Means
of Influencing State Behavior
Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that customary international
law fails to influence state behavior.2 If this is true, one must question
the implications for a policymaker contemplating using customary inter-
national law instrumentally to influence state behavior. And while
Goldsmith and Posner concede the communication value of treaties, they
nevertheless believe the problem of influence extends equally to treaty
law.
Professors Goldsmith and Posner hypothesize that many treaties fa-
cilitate cooperation among states by allowing states to communicate.
Communication in turn helps states create what is known in game theory
31. It should be noted that, in general, Professors Goldsmith and Posner have not taken a
position about the wider implications of their theory, and therefore should not be criticized for
arguments they have not made. This section is not so much a direct critique of their theory as
it is an attempt to understand its significance with respect to other aspects of international law.
32. Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that "[n]ations would act no differently if
[customary international law] were not a formally recognized source of law." Modern and
Traditional Customary International law, supra note 2, at 672.
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as focal points.33 "[I]n a game of multiple equilibria, anything that tends
to focus the players' attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way
that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the
players will expect and thus actually implement. 34 As Roger Myerson
notes, the outcome of a prisoner's dilemma is so dismal that players have
a strong incentive to enter into commitments if they are allowed to
communicate with one another before the beginning of the game. 5
Professors Goldsmith and Posner suggest that treaties can serve as
records of actions that serve as such focal points. "A treaty can record
the actions that will count as cooperative moves in an ongoing repeat
prisoner's dilemma or the actions that achieve the highest joint payoff in
a coordination game. 36 Treaties, like customary international law, "can
emerge endogenously from the rational behavior of states. '"37 Under this
view, customary international law is the label attached to particular kinds
of behavioral regularities among states, while a treaty is a label used to
refer to pronouncements about such regularities. At the same time, cus-
tomary international law and treaties differ in that the former develops in
the absence of authoritative communication among interested states,
while the latter are the product of such communication. This further ex-
plains why treaties are more likely than custom to enable cooperation
38
and coordination among states.
Despite these advantages, treaties are on the same shaky footing, in
Professors Goldsmith and Posner's view, as customary international law
in their ability to influence state behavior. Treaties, like customary
norms, do not have any binding force in themselves. 9 "States refrain
from violating treaties (when they do) because they fear retaliation from
the treaty partner(s), or because they fear a failure of coordination, not
because they feel an obligation. 40 If this is true, international law is
generally ineffective as a means of influencing state behavior, given that
treaties and customary international law are the primary sources of that
33. Theory, supra note 2, at 1170-71.
34. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 371 (1991). The con-
cept originates in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Professor
Schelling gives a good example of the focal point phenomenon. He asked a number of re-
spondents where in New York City they would meet someone if they were given no time and
location for the meeting and could not communicate with the other. The common answer was
noon at the Grand Central Station information booth. See id. at 55-56.
35. MYERSON, supra note 34, at 371-72. This description of pre-game focal negotiations
is a vastly oversimplified account of bargaining under game theory. For an introduction to
cooperative game theory, see id. at 370-416.
36. Theory, supra note 2, at 1171.
37. Id. at 1172.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1171.
40. Id.
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law. Thus, under this view, game theory informs the hypothetical
policymaker that international law helps states to cooperate, but
in the end does nothing to prevent them from defecting when their
interests change.
However, at least two qualifications should be made. First, even if
game theory predicts that departures from international law will occur
with changing interests, there is still a place for an instrumental use of
international law. One can continue to use international law to enhance
state cooperation-not an unimportant task. Perhaps game theory's
greatest potential for contributing to international law is to provide a rig-
orous means of describing and articulating important aspects of state
interaction and cooperation. 4' The hope is that fully developed game
theoretic models will help states design law that creates or enhances the
conditions for cooperation, if such cooperation is desirable. Such models
would help the international community understand better why some
problems are more intractable than others.42 States could then decide how
institutional and diplomatic resources should be allocated to address
such issues. Game theory also could assist in evaluating existing law and
suggesting improvements to that law. Finally, game theory could help
explain the conditions under which violations of a law are likely.43
Second, although game theory may describe more fully the reasons
why states depart from international norms, it is common knowledge that
such departures occur. Compliance on the international level has always
been an issue because of the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.
In that respect, game theory provides no new information about the ef-
fectiveness of international law in influencing behavior. Standard game
theory purports to explain why states break the law, but it does not indi-
cate the magnitude of the problem. That becomes an empirical question.
41. See, e.g., JON Hovi, GAMES, THREATS & TREATIES: UNDERSTANDING COMMITMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998) (using game theoretic principles to understand the
making of international commitments). It is important to note, however, that game theory has
its limits in the modeling of international behavior. For a discussion of those limitations, see
Richard E. Quandt, On the Use of Game Models in Theories of International Relations, 14
WORLD POL. 69 (1961); Peter G. Bennett, Modelling Decisions in International Relations:
Game Theory and Beyond, 39 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 19 (1995). See also GAME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PREFERENCES, INFORMATION AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
(Pierre Allan et al. eds., 1994) (discussing, inter alia, attempts to address some of the limita-
tions involved with international relations and information).
42. See, e.g., Hugh Ward, Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: The State of
Play and Beyond, 44 POL. STUD. 850, 853-62 (1996) (providing game theoretic models of
changes in policies towards global warming).
43. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in
Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (1993)
(discussing, inter alia, the use of game theory to discuss conditions for defections from arms
control treaties).
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Therefore, even though standard game theory suggests that the reasons
for obeying law stem from self-interest, that might not matter from an
instrumentalist perspective, if the frequency of departures from interna-
tional norms is relatively low. In this respect, Louis Henkin's famous
statement that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of inter-
national law and almost all of their obligations all of the time,",44 may
very well remain valid.
B. Customary International Law as
a Source of Rules of Decision
Another way to assess the significance of Professors Goldsmith and
Posner's theory is to examine it from the perspective of a judge or arbi-
trator asked to apply customary international law to resolve a dispute, or
that of a legal advisor deciding whether to use custom in advising a gov-
ernment concerning a contemplated action. Would a decisionmaker or
legal advisor be more or less inclined to use customary international law
as a source of rules of decision if she believes there are few, if any, gen-
eral or consistent practices, and none motivated by a sense of legal
obligation?
In some respects, such a belief should not matter. The judge, arbitra-
tor, or legal advisor is being asked to apply a rule to attach legal
consequences to state behavior. In that context, the rule does not describe
state behavior, it evaluates it. It does so by creating the preconditions that
allow legal institutions to intervene in some way. Speaking of contract
damages, Lon Fuller writes: "[T]he things which the law of damages
purports to 'measure' and 'determine'-the 'injuries', 'items of damage',
'causal connections', etc.-are in considerable part its own creations, and.
. the process of 'measuring' and 'determining' them is really a part of
the process of creating them.
' 4
1
Similarly, attempts to measure or determine "generality," "consis-
tency," and a "sense of legal obligation" can be viewed in large measure
as the genesis of those concepts, reflecting the evaluative function of
international law. 6 Evaluations then serve as the predicate for individual
or collective state action in response to a particular state's behavior.
Sometimes international law performs this function in connection with
retroactively attaching sanctioned consequences to state behavior. For
example, a holding by a World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
44. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
45. L.L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
46. Fernando Tes6n makes a similar distinction in describing opiniojuris. He argues, "To
say that X is a customary rule is to condemn, for moral reasons, self-interested deviation."
Tas6N supra note 3, at 90.
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Body that a member has violated a provision of the GATT is an evalua-
tion of state behavior. That evaluation forms the predicate for eventual
sanctions if the state refuses to respond appropriately to such a decision.
At other times, evaluation takes place prospectively, as when a state con-
templating a particular action tries to predict what the international
response to such action might be. Such activities have very little to do
with description. In this context, a criticism of customary international
law for its lack of descriptive power is beside the point.
At the same time, an argument that there are very few, if any, consis-
tent behaviors motivated by a sense of legal obligation might be relevant
to the evaluative function of law, because it raises questions about the
legitimacy of applying rules of decision.47 One would expect some corre-
spondence between description and evaluation, if for no other reason
than that if legal evaluations could not possibly be mapped on to com-
mon perceptions of how the world is, their legitimacy would be in
serious question. It would be difficult to justify a finding that there is an
applicable general practice among states if there was, in fact, no such
practice at all. That is why it is important to establish that there is more
true cooperation among states than would be suggested by Professors
Goldsmith and Posner's theory. There are, however, greater and lesser
degrees of correspondence. In the struggle to determine that correspon-
dence, one should not lose sight of the fact that an attack on customary
international law for its descriptive power is limited because of the dif-
ference between description and evaluation.
C. Customary International Law
as a Theory of Law
A possible mismatch between what is evaluated and what is de-
scribed might have other, even more far-reaching, implications. It may
be that customary international law is not robust as a theory of law-it is
impermissible to attach legal significance to behavioral regularities or
irregularities that are observed on the international level. Game theory
cannot provide that kind of critique, but questions about the legitimacy
or value of customary law as a theory of law arise where there is a broad
mismatch between actual state behavior and customary international
law's account of that behavior.
47. Of course, by raising the issue of legitimacy, I depart from Professor Goldsmith and
Posner's main project, which is positive, not normative. However, if law is primarily used to
evaluate behavior rather than describe it, the normative impact of their positive theory lies in
the match between what is evaluated and what is described, which in turn raises the issue of
legitimacy.
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Professors Goldsmith and Posner do not extend their theory to such
questions. They write, "The purpose of our argument is not to define law,
but to explain international behavior and its relationship to what people
call 'customary international law.' ' 41 Moreover, "the theory takes no po-
sition on the jurisprudential issue of whether international law is really
'law.' ,49 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to consider whether game theory
can serve as a critique of customary law as law-if for no other reason
than to see how far the implications of game theory can be drawn. In-
deed, some elements of Professors Goldsmith and Posner's theory hint
of such a critique. As soon as one speaks of customary law and treaty
law as lacking normative force in and of themselves, one must wonder
what this says about the status of international law as law. Moreover,
Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that one of the mistakes of tradi-
tional theorists is to construe state departures from previous
commitments or behavioral regularities as excuses or exceptions to a
customary legal norm. ° From a game theoretic perspective, such depar-
tures are simply actions of self-interested states. Why, then, is it wrong
to speak of such departures as exceptions to legal norms or as violations
of them, unless it is inappropriate to speak of such norms as legal in
some sense?'
Of course, game theory cannot sustain such an attack on law. All that
standard game theory can do is describe and explain behavioral regulari-
ties among individuals or groups of players. Although game theory
cannot say when it is appropriate to call such behavioral regularities le-
gal in nature, it likewise cannot tell us when it is inappropriate to do
so-unless one assumes that behavioral regularities that result from a
48. Theory, supra note 2, at 1121.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1167.
51. The behavioral regularities and communication among states that Professors Gold-
smith and Posner describe are quite similar to the social norms Professor Posner describes in
other writings. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). Professor Posner
argues that social norms, such as gift giving, voting, going to church, etc., are behavioral regu-
larities that people engage in to signal, "that they are desirable partners in cooperative
endeavors." Id. at 5. One of the themes of his argument is that "social norms are usefully un-
derstood as mere behavioral regularities with little independent explanatory power and
exogenous power to influence behavior." Id. at 7-8. Thus, "the claim that a social norm
caused X or Y is an empty claim." Rather, "[t]he appropriate claim is 'individuals seeking a or
b interacted in such a way as to produce behavioral regularities that we call 'social norms."'
Id. at 8. Such a description of social norms aligns with Professors Goldsmith and Posner's
description of behavioral regularities that arise on the international level.
Professor Posner does not define law in his book, but law has an impact on such norms.
Law can affect the signaling power of social norms by addressing dysfunctions of nonlegal
enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 221. For example, Professor Posner argues that the role of
contract law is to prevent defections caused by large changes in price. Id. at 157-60. What is
important for this Article's purposes is that social norms and law are not the same.
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drive to maximize utility, however understood, cannot be given legal sig-
nificance. Such an assumption requires some idea of what is meant by
'legal' and, by implication, 'law.' Game theory cannot yet call into ques-
tion the robustness of customary international law in that way.
In this regard, Fernando Tes6n also doubts game theory's ability to
sustain a more general critique of international law as law.12 Like Profes-
sors Goldsmith and Posner, he uses game theory and its premise of
self-interested behavior to criticize the positivist account of both cus-
tomary and treaty law. He points to the central pillar of the positivist
view: state consent to legal obligations. For Professor Tes6n, game the-
ory's assumption of self-interest obviates the need for such consent.
Consent, which normally serves as the basis for the binding nature of an
international norm, is relegated to a label for the recognition of a self-
maximizing norm. "Under the assumptions of game theory, consent does
not do any normative work in the explanation of international behav-
ior."53
Although Professor Tes6n uses game theory to attack the positivist
account of law, he ultimately rejects game theory as a basis for law. This
is consistent with his more general claim that the normative force of law
is ultimately grounded in ethics. Game theory does not explain "norma-
tivity" in this way. Game theory can explain why it might be in an
agent's best interest to obey law, but in Professor Tes6n's view, this is not
the same as making an ethical decision. "What is distinctive about doing
our duty is that we are obligated to do it especially when it is costly to
us, when doing it frustrates some preference or interest that we have.
That is why moral choice cannot be captured by strategic analysis.
5 4
Thus, because game theory cannot account for moral choice, it cannot
distinguish between good and evil forms of cooperation between states.55
Professor Tes6n therefore offers a competing account of state behav-
ior. He argues that states do make moral choices. Although states often
do consider self-interest, "we may assume that often they cooperate be-
cause they believe that cooperation is the right thing to do, regardless of
future payoffs. 56 This is best illustrated by the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda. To Professor Tes6n, although pacta sunt servanda is normally
viewed as a customary rule, it is actually a moral rule. An optimizing
account of human behavior would not be able to derive such a rule.57 It
52. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
53. TEs6N, supra note 3, at 85.
54. Id. at 79.
55. Id. at 92-94.
56. Id. at 80.
57. Id. at 89.
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would be illogical for a system based on the maximization of utility to
derive a rule requiring an individual state to act against its interest. 8
Although game theory cannot serve as a critique of law as such, it
raises important negative implications for customary international law as
law. Suppose there are few instances of behavioral regularities among
states attributable to coordination or cooperation, and frequent deviations
from what regularities do exist. One could argue it is not particularly
helpful to have a law that applies in very few cases, that implies the in-
ternational community is comprised of scofflaws, or both.
With respect to customary international law, however, the first impli-
cation may not be so problematic. It would not be surprising that, even
under the traditional view of customary international law, relatively few
state practices can be construed as customary legal norms. Professors
Goldsmith and Posner have gone a step further, attempting to show that
even those few areas where customary international law seems to apply
are questionable. This, of course, raises concerns about the legitimacy of
customary international law as an evaluative tool, if it becomes too far
removed from what actually takes place among states.
The second possibility, that the world is comprised of scofflaws, is
again an empirical question about the level of compliance with interna-
tional norms. Just as no one would respect a law everyone breaks, so too
should one question a theory of law that implies that everyone is a law-
breaker, no matter how well grounded that theory.
Thus, the real impact of a game theoretic claim that customary inter-
national law fails to describe state behavior lies in the match between
law's evaluative function and the phenomena to which such law is ap-
plied. It is not necessary that there be an exact correspondence between
the two, since by definition there cannot be an exact, or perhaps even
close, correspondence. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of customary inter-
national law, both in terms of its acceptability to the world community
when used to attach legal consequences to state behavior and as a theory
of law, is roughly proportional to the degree to which its evaluations
track what is described. Thus, customary international law would stand
on firmer footing if there were evidence of greater cooperation among
states, and if the application of game theoretic models to international
behavior would allow for more true cooperation. For these reasons, it is
appropriate to look more closely at cooperation on the international
level.
58. Professor Tes6n's strong concept of legal obligation is utilized later in this Article.
See infra Part IV.B. Although law is ultimately grounded in the shared values of a community,
one need not go as far as Professor Tes6n does to understand that game theory (at least in its
standard form) is limited in its ability to account for law.
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III. COOPERATION AMONG STATES
Customary international law claims states are engaging in a common
and consistent practice, which presumes that they are cooperating with
one another. This Part argues that there is enough cooperation among
states to justify such a claim. This argument is based on three supporting
assertions. First, the four strategic situations-coincidence of interest,
coercion, cooperation, and coordination-should account for the behav-
ioral regularities reflected in both customary international law and
treaties. These situations cannot, however, account for the plethora of
treaties without modifications to the models that could apply equally
well to customary law. This increases the probability that one is observ-
ing true cooperation with respect to customary law. Second, the complex
way in which treaties and customary international law interact support
the claim that they are more properly viewed together as methods for
enabling cooperation among states. Third, game theoretic models would
account for such levels of cooperation.
A. Treaties as Evidence of Cooperation Among States
The last century witnessed a mushrooming of treaty law, particularly
after the Second World War. The United Nations is now the repository of
over 40,000 certified true texts of treaties. 9 How might game theory ac-
count for this evidence of large-scale cooperation among states? Why
would a state be willing to bind itself to a treaty? It is unlikely to do so
simply because its interests just happen to coincide with another's. A
state would be aware that the conditions that give rise to coincidence are
ethereal-its interests could quickly change. A state would not lock itself
into a treaty under those circumstances. If it finds that it is preferable to
commit itself to a treaty, then the state is probably in some other game,
one that gives rise to true cooperation. In addition, states could cooperate
through treaty making because they find themselves in a repeated pris-
oner's dilemma or in a coordination game. Professors Goldsmith and
Posner, however, believe that the conditions that would allow for coop-
eration in those scenarios are relatively rare. If so, there should be no
basis for cooperation or coordination irrespective of what form such co-
operation or coordination takes. In a repeated prisoner's dilemma that
eventually results in a treaty, states must have the same low future dis-
count necessary for true cooperation that results in a customary norm.
Similarly, whether one uses a multilateral treaty or a customary legal
59. Palitha T.B. Kohona, The United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 140, 141 (1998).
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norm to coordinate railroad gauges (an example Professors Goldsmith
and Posner use), there must still be agreement on a standard gauge.6
0
If cooperation does not explain these treaties, there are three other
possibilities. The first is that most treaties are coerced. That does not
seem plausible, although, of course, examples do exist. The second is
that the conditions that make cooperation possible under repeated pris-
oner's dilemma or coordination games are present. Third, either
communication or another set of factors is present that makes possible
cooperation and coordination when states interact, but is not captured in
the standard repeated prisoner's dilemma or coordination game.
Note what happens, though, if either of the two latter possibilities is
allowed. If the conditions for cooperation are more prevalent than
thought, this also means that cooperation among states that does not re-
sult in treaties might be more prevalent as well. Such cooperation might
well serve as the basis for customary international law. If, for example,
communication is considered, what precludes states from communicat-
ing about issues that do not eventually result in treaties? Since
communication facilitates greater cooperation, it would seem natural for
states to communicate about issues of importance to them, decide
whether or not to cooperate and then determine whether to embody such
cooperation in either a treaty or a customary legal norm. This would
mean that far more stable behavioral regularities result from versions of
the repeated prisoner's dilemma or coordination game that could serve as
the basis for international law, and in particular, a general and consistent
practice of states.
B. The Interaction of Custom and Treaties
States have recognized a close relationship between treaties and cus-
tom. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
establishes, inter alia, sources of international law as both treaties and
customary international law. 6' Both have been recognized by states
through this treaty as legitimate sources of international law to be used
by the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes among states. In
an odd way, the treaty itself points to an almost recursive relationship
between the two sources of law because by treaty, states have acknowl-
edged that customary law exists and is authoritative. Indeed, any time
states submit a dispute to an international tribunal that uses customary
60. Although ultimately critical of game theory as a sufficient basis for international law,
Professor Tes6n is also of the view that a game theoretic account of treaties would explain
treaties as solutions to coordination problems and the repeated prisoner's dilemma. TEs6N,
supra note 3, at 82-83. He also believes that treaties would be unnecessary in the case of coin-
cidence of interests. Id. at 81-82.
61. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Art. 38.
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international law they acknowledge the validity of such law as a source
of rules of decision.
The relationship between the two sources of law is complex and dy-
namic. Customary international law often gives rise to treaties, as when a
treaty codifies existing customary law. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties is a good example. 62 As is well known, that treaty is gen-
erally acknowledged to codify previously existing customary
international law on the formation, interpretation, and termination of
treaties.63 Such codifications are rarely, if ever, a simple restatement of
the law; customary international law often is unable to systematically
treat all of the issues that may arise within a given subject matter. The
process of codification, therefore, often serves as a further development
and elaboration of the norms that are being expressed in treaty form.
Further, codification may actually be the last step in 'crystallizing' norms
that have not yet attained the status of law.6 At the same time, the fact
that customary international law and treaty law touching the same area
may overlap does not necessarily affect the legal force of either source of
law.65
Treaties, on the other hand, may serve to create customary interna-
tional law.6 Article 38 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
contemplates that it is possible for a treaty rule to become binding on a
state as a customary rule recognized as such.67 A good example of this is
found in a report cited by the International Court of Justice to support a
general finding that humanitarian law is binding not only as treaty law
but also as customary international law.68 In that report, the United Na-
tions Secretary General lists a number of treaties that together constitute
a part of international humanitarian law that apply during armed con-
62. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. 336
Ihereinafter Vienna Convention].
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Part IIl introductory note (1987) (accepting the Vienna Convention "as, in general constituting
a codification of the customary international law governing international agreements").
64. For a discussion of the process of "crystallization" and the issues that arise from it,
see H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 16-30, 80-94
(1992); MARK E. VILLAGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES (2d ed. 1997).
65. For example, the International Court of Justice found, in the Nicaragua case, that al-
though Article 51 of the UN Charter governs the right of individual and collective self-
defense, the United States was still bound by customary international law on the same subject.
The court wrote, "Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a
'natural' or 'inherent' right of self-defense, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Char-
ter." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
66. VILLAGER, supra note 64, at 167-92.
67. Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 38.
68. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 258 (July 8).
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flict.69 The Secretary General reports that that part of humanitarian law
"has beyond doubt become part of international customary law.
' 70
To complete the circle, subsequent developments in customary inter-
national law can affect previously existing treaties. As Nancy Kontou
observes, when a treaty is established, the subject matter of that treaty
continues to evolve.7 "State practice may continue evolving outside the
convention in response to changing conditions or perceptions of inter-
ests, and new conflicting custom may emerge as a result. ' 72 In such
circumstances, "[o]ne party has the right to call for the termination or
revision of a treaty on account of the development of new custom.''73
The close relationship between customary international law and trea-
ties has a number of implications for a game theoretic treatment of those
sources. First, the way in which treaties and customary law can give rise
to the other indicates that both sources should be understood as
manifesting cooperation among states or assisting in such cooperation.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is understood to have
codified existing customary law on that subject. John Setear makes a
persuasive argument that this law is itself designed to enhance coopera-
tion by providing occasions for frequent iterations of strategic
encounters among states at each stage of treaty formation.74 If this is true,
then the law of treaties performed that function before it was codified in
the Convention and thus serves as an example of customary international
law being used to facilitate state cooperation. Indeed, the creation of the
Convention is itself an example of such cooperation. In this respect, any
treaty that codifies previously existing customary norms reflects coop-
erative behavior that has already emerged in the formation of the
underlying customary norm.
Second, the relationship between the two sources of law strengthens
an argument that communication can result in both forms. Assume that
69. Id. Those treaties are: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection
of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the laws and Customs of War on Land
and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945. Id.
70. Id. There is something of a chicken and egg question here. The Court continued by
stating that the treaties on humanitarian law reflected pre-existing customary international law
on the same subject. Id.
71. NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN LIGHT OF NEW
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1994); cf THIRLWAY, supra note 64, at 95 (arguing that
if an area of international law has been codified in treaty, customary international law is ancil-
lary).
72. KONTOU, supra note 71, at 10, 69.
73. Id. at 145. For a discussion of the conditions when such a rule applies, see id. at
146-47. See also VILLAGER, supra note 64, at 193-226.
74. Setear, supra note 3.
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communication among states tends towards the treaty form. To the extent
that a customary norm is generated from an existing treaty rule, it is
plausible to construe that norm as the product of the communication that
took place during the formation of the underlying treaty rule. This in turn
means that the customary norm might reflect true cooperation made pos-
sible by such communication.
Third, (although well beyond the scope of this Article) the relation-
ship between sources points game theory in the direction of more
dynamic modeling of the forms of law. That is, one sees legal regimes
evolving not only in terms of substance but also in form, from custom, to
treaty, and back again. This is not to say that form and substance are not
interrelated: it is not necessarily the case, or even likely, that a regime
governed by treaty would be completely replaced by one governed by
customary law.75 Nevertheless, a reasonable approach would be to first
examine the emergence of a norm and then examine the form in which it
takes.
Differences in the way in which treaty norms and customary norms
are created, implemented, and amended present various advantages and
disadvantages such that states find it useful to employ both forms of law
depending on particular circumstances. For example, treaty negotiation
often involves high transaction costs. If the benefits of having an interna-
tional norm embodied in treaty form outweigh those transaction costs, a
state will incur them; otherwise, a state may choose to allow the norm to
remain in its customary form. Similarly, with respect to amending inter-
national norms, the "choice" between treaty and customary forms might
depend in part on a calculation of the costs and benefits of "lock-in," that
is, the permanence of the legal norm. If states want to ensure perma-
nence, they will choose the treaty form, but at the risk of being held to a
norm even though the conditions that gave rise to that norm might
change. In contrast (putting aside for now the logical problems raised by
opinio juris), a customary international norm is arguably more malle-
able.
On the other hand, the fact that there are so many treaties might in-
dicate that the treaty form tends to be preferred. Treaty law tends to be
clearer, more precise, and more accessible than customary law. When
clarity, precision, and accessibility are desirable, then the treaty form
may prevail. Customary law takes time to develop and thus is unsuitable
when rapidly changing events require a faster response by the world
75. VILLAGER, supra note 64, at 192. Some argue that treaties do not have the advantage
in this regard. See 0. A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 173-87 (1998) (criticizing the supposed advantages of treaties as a source of
international law).
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community. 6 Further, the increase in the number of states and interna-
tional organizations might make treaties the preferred form.77 For one
thing, the large number of states itself makes it difficult to determine
customary rules. However, given the complex interaction of custom and
treaties, states may have less control over the shape international norms
will take than one might expect.
C. Cooperation, Communication, and New Games
There are two possible explanations for the relatively high degree of
cooperation and coordination among states, as evidenced by the large
number of treaties. First, some prisoner's dilemma or coordination
games are being played under conditions (for example, caring about the
future) that create incentives for cooperation. Second, either communica-
tion or some other factor not captured in the standard repeated prisoner's
dilemma or coordinating game makes cooperation and coordination
among states possible.
It should be noted that it is not necessary that states should cooperate
with one another. Game theory indicates that in certain games, optimal
results can be achieved only through cooperation. If game theoretic prin-
ciples can elucidate when state cooperation is likely, and if the presence
of such conditions seems plausible on the international scene, then one
might expect stable coordinated behaviors that are candidates for a gen-
eral and consistent state practice." Nor will states always cooperate or be
likely to.79
In addition, although I will discuss game theoretic models that pur-
port to account for state behavior, I will also refer to game theoretic
models that account for the behavior of individuals or groups of indi-
viduals. Professors Goldsmith and Posner argue that it is "hazardous" to
equate state behavior with individual behavior. For one thing, they argue,
individuals are subject to a number of cultural, historical, and biological
76. THIRLWAY, supra note 64, at 1-2.
77. There may also be historical reasons for preferring the treaty form. Writing in the
1970s, H.W.A. Thirlway also argues that a number of the newer states that emerged out of the
colonial era rejected customary rules that purportedly supported colonial structures. Id. at 4.
78. 1 will treat the issue of general and consistent practice later in this Part. See infra text
accompanying notes 135-36.
79. However, if cooperation at the state level does not occur, one would expect that ra-
tional international actors would attempt to find ways outside of the state machinery to
cooperate or coordinate, to the extent such cooperation or coordination is necessary to achieve
marginally better outcomes. This appears to be borne out in reality. The integrative forces of
globalization could be understood as the result of many international players, including non-
governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and individuals and government agen-
cies, who are interacting strategically. If states are unable to arrive at fitter strategies that allow
for greater payoffs on the international level, over time they will grow obsolete.
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forces that influence behavior but do not apply to states.80 Further, the
process of state decisionmaking with respect to foreign policy decisions
is much more complex than individual decisionmaking.8 '
I agree that there are differences between the behavior of individuals
and what motivates them and the behavior and motivations of states. For
example, the sheer number of individuals interacting with each other
makes possible the emergence of cooperative patterns that might not be
possible with a collection of some 190 states (although later I qualify
this). I am prepared, though, to give greater credence to the evidence
with respect to individuals for three reasons. First, as I discuss in detail
below, states themselves are subject to both legal and extralegal forces
that constrain behavior and are roughly analogous to cultural forces that
constrain individuals. For example, although an individual "rogue" state
may not care about such a label, most states try to avoid behaviors that
would result in being labeled as such by the rest of the world's nations.
Economic globalization is creating powerful incentives for concerted
action among states. To be sure, these are economic as opposed to cul-
tural forces, but the fact that states are motivated to engage in concerted
behavior for economic reasons does not detract from the fact that such
forces also limit state behavior.
Equally important, (although initial work is being done in this area)
it is not yet possible to make fine distinctions between types of players."
80. They write:
[1]ndividual action takes place in an environment of dense and overlapping institu-
tions, including families, governments, churches, and workplaces, all of which
sanction those who deviate from norms, habituate people to behavior consistent
with norms, and have roots that plunge deep into history and (in the case of the
family) biology. Although international institutions exist, they are not as numerous,
dense, and effective as domestic institutions.
Theory, supra note 2, at 1138-39 n.54.
81. "[B]ecause the individual decisionmaking process differs from the national decision-
making process (which involves bargaining and compromise among many constituencies
within a political framework), arguing about one on the basis of an analysis of the other is
hazardous" Id.
82. As James Morrow puts it: "[Game theory] is a theory of interdependent decisions-
when the decisions of two or more individuals jointly determine the outcome of a situation.
The 'individuals' can be persons or collective entities that make consistent choices." JAMES D.
MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1 (1994).
Game theoreticians are now beginning to use models that do not view states as unitary ac-
tors. See, e.g., Keisuke lida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter: Two-Level
Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. CONFLICT RES. 403 (1993) (using game theoretic principles to
model the relationship between international negotiations and domestic decisionmaking proc-
esses). A series of articles on this topic was published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in
1997. See, e.g., Robert Pahre & Paul A. Papyoanou, Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and
International Politics, 41 J. CONFLICT RES. 4 (1997); James D. Morrow, When Do "Relative
Gains" Impede Trade?, 41 J. CONFLICT RES. 12 (1997); Suzanne Lohmann, Linkage Politics,
41 J. CONFLICT RES. 38 (1997).
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The very examples that Professors Goldsmith and Posner use to show
conditions under which behavioral regularity could emerge among
states-coincidence, coercion, cooperation, and coordination-all have
their origins in game theory as games played by individuals. On the level
of those basic games, there is no meaningful distinction between indi-
viduals and states: the prisoner's dilemma is a dilemma whether the
prisoner is a person or a country. Finally, quite often state action reflects
the decisions of a relatively small number of individuals in power. To be
sure, such individuals are highly influenced by other factors, but it seems
unlikely that individual choice can be completely factored out in an ac-
count of international decisionmaking.
D. The Conditions for Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma and Coordination Games
As Professors Goldsmith and Posner note, under certain conditions,
cooperation among players is possible even in a prisoner's dilemma. 3
Robert Axelrod hosted two tournaments in which he invited contestants
to submit strategies for the prisoner's dilemma and played them off one
another. Before the second tournament, Professor Axelrod disclosed the
results of the first and allowed the contestants to modify their strategies
based on those results. The strategy that resulted in the highest overall
score for both tournaments was Tit for Tat, a strategy that cooperated on
the first move and then followed whatever the other player did.84 It was a
successful strategy because it did not compare its scores to those of other
players, never started out by defecting, it retaliated immediately after the
other defected, it forgave an opponent that resumed cooperating, and it
was easily understood by other players.85
Professor Axelrod's work received much attention because it ap-
peared to demonstrate that cooperation was possible, and indeed
desirable, even in a game such as the prisoner's dilemma. However, Pro-
fessor Axelrod and other game theoreticians are aware that cooperation
is not inevitable under all conditions. Each player must have a relatively
low future discount. Each player must expect to encounter the other in
the future. Finally, the payoffs for cooperation must outweigh the pay-
offs for defection8 6
As Eric Rasmusen notes, there are at least three reasons why one
should not expect cooperation to arise out of every repeated prisoner's
83. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLU-
TION OF COOPERATION (1984).
84. AXELROD, supra note 83, at 31-32.
85. Id. at 109-23.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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dilemma. Tit for Tat never beats any strategy on a one-on-one basis.87 Tit
for Tat won the two tournaments because it earned a relatively large
number of points per round, but it never had the highest score in any one
game. Thus, in an elimination tournament, Tit for Tat would be elimi-
nated relatively early.8" In addition, Professor Rasmusen argues, a player
would normally want to revise its strategy based on those of the others.
Although some of the strategies designed for the second tournament
would have won the first, they did poorly because the environment of the
second tournament had changed. Other programs that did allow for
changing strategies did not do well in the game, but would have done
better had there been more iterations of the game.89 Finally, if there are
occasional defections through what is known as trembles, two Tit for
Tatters facing each other would do poorly because a defection would be
followed by defection and so on.90 "Tit-for-tat is suboptimal for any
given environment, but is robust across environments, and that is its ad-
vantage."9'
Cooperation is thus possible but not inevitable. The issue then is
whether the conditions for cooperation are present among states. Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis show that conditions that exist in communi-
ties make possible the emergence of pro-social behaviors. They suggest
that one reason that communities, such as residential neighborhoods, old
boy networks, ethnic associations, etc., might persist in modern life is
because they foster cooperative behavior among individuals who face
cooperation problems raised by strategic situations like the prisoner's
dilemma.92 A community is "a structure of social interaction character-
ized by high entry and exit costs and non-anonymous relationships
among members." 93 Interactions among members are frequent. In addi-
tion, "communities lack a centralized structure capable of making
87. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 152 (3rd ed. 2001).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. This refers to a small chance that a player will pick an out-of-equilibrium strategy. Id.
at 139.
91. Id. In international relations, another critique of the Tit for Tat approach is that coop-
eration among states is unlikely because states are concerned with relative gains; that is, they
evaluate their own gains in light of the gains of other states. Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt
find, however, that cooperation can emerge even when relative gains are a concern, as long as
the choice of strategies allows for retaliation when there are defections. Marc L. Busch & Eric
R. Reinhardt, Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation Un-
der Anarchy, 37 J. CONFLICT RES. 427 (1993).
92. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Moral Economy of Communities: Structured
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decisions binding on its members."94 Members of a community, there-
fore, cannot enforce bargains.
This description of communities is relevant here. From the perspec-
tive of individuals, the state is the result of the complex interaction of
many individuals and coalitions of individuals. From the perspective of
states interacting with other states on the international level, however,
states appear to share the characteristics of a community of individuals.
Like communities of individuals, states as a group have very high entry
and exit costs. They are not anonymous with respect to each other, and
they interact frequently. There is no central authority capable of making
decisions binding on states.
Professors Bowles and Gintis show that even though community
members cannot enforce agreements, communities nevertheless encour-
age cooperation in three ways: through reputation effects, retaliation
effects, and segmentation effects. By reputation effects, Professors
Bowles and Gintis mean that where, as in a community, there is a high
frequency of interaction among members, the cost of gathering informa-
tion about members lowers and the benefits from gaining such
information rises.95 The wide availability of information creates an incen-
tive among agents to act in ways beneficial to others in the community.
"Thus when agents engage in repeated interaction, they have an incen-
tive to act in ways that build their 'reputation' for cooperative
behavior."
96
According to the model, then, relatively low information costs about
players will create incentives to gain a reputation for being cooperative.
Does this obtain for states? On the one hand, information about a state's
likely intentions and motives is quite costly. Many countries, such as the
United States, spend significant resources to obtain information about,
and predict, the likely behavior of other states. On the other hand, states,
like people, have reputations for being cooperative or not, based on his-
tory. Such information is relatively inexpensive. 97 In this sense, it would
94. Id. at 4.
95. Id. at 7, 11-14.
96. Id. at 7.
97. It would be interesting in this regard to examine from a game theoretic perspective
the role the United Nations plays in the interactions of states. Even if we put aside the legal
significance of state activity at the United Nations level, such as official statements and UN
resolutions, such a role has the potential of being quite important. The UN's existence has at
least two effects: it makes possible an almost daily set of interactions between states and low-
ers the cost of obtaining information about a given state. For an example of game theoretic
principles as applied to international regimes more generally, see James D. Morrow, Modeling
the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 49 INT'L ORG. 387
(1994).
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behoove a state to engage in cooperative behavior, if only to enhance its
reputation as a cooperative state."
The retaliation effect occurs when persons who know that they will
have long-term interactions with others act favorably to avoid future re-
percussions.99 This is an elaboration of Professor Axelrod's findings.
Professors Bowles and Gintis show that high entry and exit costs with an
associated expectation of frequent interaction increases the likelihood of
cooperative outcomes. Repeated encounters change interactions among
community members in two ways. First, they allow members to adopt
more complicated strategies that take into account the prior actions of
other members and second, they require that a player take into account
the aggregate payoffs over the entire game'0° (thereby addressing two of
the reasons Professor Rasmusen identifies why the repeated prisoner's
dilemma does not always result in cooperation'°0 ). They then show that if
the probability of terminating the game is sufficiently low, Tit for Tat
becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy; 0 2 that is, unilateral defections
98. Professors Goldsmith and Posner are skeptical that a concern for reputation will in-
fluence state behavior, in part because states will preserve their reputations only when it is in
their interest to do so. Theory, supra note 2, at 1135-37. But the point of Professors Bowles
and Gintis' work is that existing conditions in community-like settings make it unlikely that a
rational actor would cease to care about its reputation.
As rational actors, foreign-policymakers would consider reputation. A good example co-
mes from transcripts of recordings made during the Cuban Missile Crisis. One of the early
options for responding to the presence of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba was surprise air
strikes to destroy the missiles before they became operational. One of several reasons a sur-
prise attack was ruled out was the adverse impact that it would have on the United States'
reputation. Under-Secretary of State George Ball, argued that Premier Khrushchev needed to
be warned before any military action:
Even though it may be illusory, I think we still have to [warn him], because I think
that the impact on the opinion and the reaction [of the allied countries] would be
very much different than a course of action where we strike without warning, that's
like Pearl Harbor. It's the kind of conduct that one expects of the Soviet Union. It is
not the conduct that one expects of the United States.
THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143
(Ernest R. May et. al eds., 1997). Attorney General Robert Kennedy returned to this theme. "I
think George Ball has a hell of a good point.... I think it's the whole question of, you know,
assuming that you do survive all this, the fact that we're not ... the kind of country we are."
Id. at 149. Secretary of State Dean Rusk interjected, "This business of carrying the mark of
Cain on your brow for the rest of your life is something..." Id. Robert Kennedy completed
his thought. "We did this against Cuba. We've fought for 15 years with Russia to prevent a
first strike against us [unclear]. Now, in the interest of time, we do that to a small country. I
think it's a hell of a burden to carry." Id.
99. Bowles & Gintis, supra note 92, at 7, 14-17.
100. Id. at 14-15.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
102. The term derives from the application of game theory to biology. "An [evolutionar-
ily stable strategy] is a strategy, such that if all the members of a population adopt it, then no
mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection." JOHN
MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES, 10 (1982).
[Vol. 23:143
Game Theory and Customary International Law
will not cause cooperation to deteriorate.)°3
States can be characterized as having high entry and exit costs. Al-
though new states do emerge, it is difficult to achieve international
recognition as a state. Further, although one does not usually speak of
states exiting, there are relatively few instances when states completely
disappear from the scene. If they do disappear, it is usually as the result
of great upheaval. The net effect is that states understand that they will
interact frequently and that the possibility of terminating relations is
relatively low.
The third effect, the segmentation effect, occurs in a population of
many communities. In such a situation, it is more likely for a member of
a community to interact with another member than with someone else
randomly selected from the rest of the population. This enhances the fre-
quency of likes interacting. "A result is that pro-social behaviors are
more likely to be rewarded, those with pro-social norms begin more
likely to interact with other pro-social agents, and conversely for anti-
social behaviors? ' 04 Under these circumstances, cooperation among
states is possible.
Other factors may also make agreement possible in coordination
games. Professors Goldsmith and Posner are skeptical of the possibility
of coordination on a multilateral level because of the difficulties and ex-
pense of coordination among a relatively large number of states.' °5 R.
Harrison Wagner observes that high coordination costs tend to reduce the
present value of any future agreement to a level less than non-
agreement.' °6 Even so, Professor Wagner argues that the problem of costs
is ameliorated by two factors. First, the emergence of large-scale organi-
zations is probably related to the ability of small groups to dominate
large groups.' °7 Second, to the extent that major states or coalitions of
states behave as unitary actors, cooperation is possible among them be-
cause the conditions for cooperation exist among such states.'
0 8
103. Bowles & Gintis, supra note 92, at 15-17.
104. Id. at 7, 17-19. Except with respect to alliances of states, this effect does not appear
to be as relevant to state cooperation.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
106. R. Harrison Wagner, The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Coop-
eration, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 344 (1983).
107. Id.
108. Id. For example, the then-newly independent states in Africa and Asia played an
important role in the creation of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties. See Emmanuel G. Bello, Reflections on Succession of States in the Light of the Vi-
enna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, 23 GERMAN Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 296 (1980).
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E. Communication
Despite the absence of enforceable agreements, communication can
still facilitate cooperation by providing focal points for certain optimal
strategies. Assume that communication is a crucial factor in making pos-
sible cooperation at the international level. As noted, treaties sometimes
result from customary international law and customary international law
sometimes emerges from treaties; thus, it is hard to pinpoint when com-
munication first takes place. What counts as communication in a treaty
may count as communication in the formation of a subsequent custom-
ary norm, or, in the case of a codifying treaty, may well be the product of
communication that formed the basis for the pre-existing customary
norm.
Communication plays an important role in the formation of contem-
porary customary international law in another respect. As Jonathan
Charney notes, contemporary customary international law often traces its
roots to international fora such as the United Nations General Assembly,
the Security Council, and other standing or ad hoc international
groups.'09 At such fora, states address issues of common concern. Profes-
sor Charney writes:
Sometimes these efforts result in a consensus on solving the
problem and express it in normative terms of general applica-
tion. At other times, the potential new law is developed through
the medium of international relations or the practices of special-
ized international institutions and at later stages is addressed in
international forums. That process draws attention to the rule
and helps to shape and crystallize it."0
In game theoretic terms, these types of fora provide states with the
opportunity to communicate, thereby creating focal points that enable
cooperation that would not otherwise be possible in certain games."'
109. Jonathan 1. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-44
(1993). Other examples include the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, an intergov-
ernmental organization that prepares recommendations and reports on promoting women's
rights. Commission on the Status of Women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/
index.html#functions (last visited Nov. 9, 2001). In addition, the United Nations Forum on
Forests is an intergovernmental organization established to develop international norms with
respect to forest management and conservation. Report of the United Nations Forum on For-
ests on its First Session, U.N. ESCOR, 2001 Sess., U.N. Doc. E/2001/42/Rev. 1 (2001).
110. Charney, supra note 109, at 544.
111. "A functioning [international] regime elicits messages that allow the players to form
expectations about one another's upcoming move." Morrow, supra note 97, at 404. Professor
Morrow cites the International Telegraph Union, an international organization used to develop
common standards for international messages, as an example of an international regime that
allowed for the international solution of coordination games. Id. at 390-92.
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F. Variations of Older Games and Evolutionary Games
Another way to account for relatively high levels of cooperation
among states is to vary rules of the games already considered, or to in-
troduce new games. For example, in The Theory of Games and the
Problem of International Cooperation,"' Professor Wagner experiments
with three changes to the prisoner's dilemma. Along with increasing the
number of players in the game, a second change is to allow players to
make repeated choices in a single game. In this situation, cooperation
will be the optimal strategy in any situation where the players have full
knowledge of the other's choices, as long as no one believes that he or
she is making the last or next to last choice." 3 Thus, the players are given
the chance to modify their strategies based on information about the
other players' strategies. The modified game is similar to the repeated
prisoner's dilemma, but differs because the repeated moves take place
within a single game. Thus, cooperation is readily identifiable as an op-
timal strategy, whereas cooperation as the optimal strategy is not as
apparent in the repeated game. It takes many iterations of the repeated
prisoner's dilemma before the advantages of cooperation begin to show
themselves.' 4 Thus, in the area of arms control, Professor Wagner argues
that if a state is confident that it can detect an opponent's cheating, and
re-arm before the opponent can take advantage of such cheating, then the
arm's control agreement can be stable."'
The third change Professor Wagner makes is to give the players in a
prisoner's dilemma more than two moves. Recall that in the standard
Professors Goldsmith and Posner also argue that communication about customary interna-
tional law itself can lead to cooperation, which explains why states that are not influenced by
customary norms nevertheless claim they are. "[A] nation's self-serving statement of its views
about the content of [customary international law] can provide meaningful information that
can, in the right circumstances, allow nations to cooperate." Modern and Traditional Custom-
ary International Law, supra note 2, at 665.
It should be noted, however, that communication alone does not ensure cooperation or co-
ordination. James Morrow shows that international attempts at cooperation involve competing
incentives created by distribution and information problems that arise in international coordi-
nation games. Morrow, supra note 97, at 403-07.
112. Wagner, supra note 106, at 330.
113. Id. at 333. In theory, if players knew exactly how many rounds they will play, they
would defect from the beginning. If they knew that they were playing the last round, they
would be tempted to defect since defection would result in greater gain to an individual, and
there would be no need to worry about retaliation in subsequent moves. But if this were so,
players in the second-to-the last round would also defect, since they know that defection will
happen in the last round. This logic applies through continuously earlier rounds until it applies
at the first round of the game.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 334. Professor Wagner speculates that one of the reasons state cooperation is
relatively easy to achieve in some areas and more difficult in others is the ability to detect and
respond to violations of any agreements. Id.
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game, a player has a choice of either defecting or cooperating. If players
are allowed to make other moves, than it is possible for the players to-
gether to devise strategies that will enhance the possibility for
cooperation, such as retaliatory moves that each player has confidence
in.' 16 Further, each individual player can devise retaliatory measures that
increase its confidence in the other's cooperation.' 7 Additionally, allow-
ing for more moves allows parties to bargain."' This is not to say that
bargaining alone ensures cooperation. As discussed above, bargaining,
especially among large groups of states, can be costly and in other cir-
cumstances creates opportunities for coercion. Bargaining, however,
does allow one to break the impasse posed by the prisoner's dilemma.
Other more sophisticated models of social norm formation also ex-
ist. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure,"9 H. Peyton Young
proposes a model for the emergence of social institutions based on ficti-
tious play.'20 An institution for him is "an established law, custom, usage,
practice, organization." 2 ' His model attempts to show how individuals
interacting with limited knowledge and sometimes erratically, will never-
theless over time arrive at social equilibria, such as "language, codes of
dress, forms of money and credit, patterns of courtship and marriage,
116. Id. at 336.
117. Id. Professor Wagner is aware that such measures may create a security dilemma:
increasing one party's security has the potential for decreasing the security of the other,
thereby increasing the possibility of defection. But, Professor Wagner argues that although the
security dilemma is a real problem, the existence of such a dilemma itself is not a sufficient
condition for a defensive first-strike or an arms race. Id. at 337-42.
118. Id. at 342-44.
119. H. PEYTON YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1998). For an
overview of Professor Young's approach, see HERBERT GINTIs, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A
PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 229-36 (2000)
[hereinafter GAME THEORY EVOLVING].
Professors Goldsmith and Posner feel that Professor Young's work is unlikely to be rele-
vant to customary international law. Theory, supra note 2, at 1131 n.42. For them, Professor
Young's model "shows that as long as parties either experiment or occasionally make errors,
and as long as they interact frequently, parties will eventually coordinate on Pareto-optimal
actions." Id. However, they argue " '[e]ventually' . . . may be a very long time, and the games
the model uses rely on institutional structure that is lacking with respect to [customary interna-
tional law]." Id.
Despite this critique, Professor Young's model might, indeed, hold more promise for un-
derstanding customary international law than Professors Goldsmith and Posner believe. First,
with respect to institutions, the games that Professor Young's model uses do not require insti-
tutions; they are used to explain the emergence of institutions. In other words, customary
international law might be one of the institutions that allows for international cooperation. See
infra text accompanying notes 127-32. The issue of time, however, is open. but Professor
Young does account for the need for time to arrive at equilibrium. See infra text accompanying
notes 135-37.
120. In fictitious play, a player bases her strategy on the past history of her opponent's
moves.
121. YOUNG, supra note 119, at xi.
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accounting standards, rules of the road."'12 Individuals "adjust their be-
havior based on what they think other agents are going to do, and these
expectations are generated endogenously by information about what
other agents have done in the past."'2 3 This adjustment creates a feedback
mechanism in which the individual's responsive action creates a prece-
dent, which creates expectations about that person's likely future
behavior, which in turn leads another individual to act, which creates yet
another own precedent, and so on. 24 Over time, out of this feedback
mechanism emerge patterns of behavior that constitute institutions. Insti-
tutions such as customs, practices, etc., are "predictable patterns of




One of the examples Professor Young gives for the evolution of insti-
tutions is the adoption of the right-hand driving convention in Europe, a
process that spanned some two hundred years. 26 Deciding on which side
of the road to drive can be understood as a coordination game between
two persons approaching from opposite directions. It does not matter
which side they use, so long as each chooses the same side. In the early
stages, when traffic was relatively low, conventions emerged locally. As
the amount of traffic increased, local conventions congealed into re-
gional and then national conventions, finally being codified into national
laws in the nineteenth century. 2' At the international level, the emer-
128gence of the right-hand rule received a push from the Napoleonic wars.
France switched from a primarily left-hand rule to a right-hand rule after
the French revolution, a custom that Napoleon adopted for his armies
and in turn spread throughout Europe during his campaigns. 29 Professor
Young notes that thereafter, a gradual shift emerged, roughly from west
to east, to the right-hand rule.'30
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 6. As Professor Gintis notes, game theory posits at least four ways in which
an agent can "choose" a strategy. The first is to predict the expected behavior of other players
and choose a best response. The second is to inherit a strategy from one's parents and play it
regardless of what other players do. The third is to mimic another's strategy, perhaps if it
appears to be more successful. The fourth is to recall the other player's past strategies and
develop a best response to it. GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 229-30.
For an argument that states do take into account the past history of other state's moves,
see Catherine C. Langlois & Jean-Pierre Langlois, Behavioral Issues of Rationality in Interna-
tional Interaction, 43 J. CONFLICT RES. 818 (1999).
124. YOUNG, supra note 119, at 6.
125. Id. at 144.
126. Id. at 16-17.
127. ld. at 16.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id.
130. Id. Portugal switched after World War I. Austria switched from province to prov-
ince, completing the process with the Anschluss with Germany in 1938. Hungary and
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This example, and Professor Young's model more generally, provide
fresh insights into the emergence of international cooperation. The
emergence of the right-hand rule is an example in which norms arise
from the bottom up, from random encounters on domestic roads to the
adoption of a common standard by several countries. If this cooperation
explains some international norms, then to understand international co-
operation more fully, one needs to look at the cooperation that emerges
from individual interactions and which spreads from thence to the re-
gional, national, and international levels.
Two more points should be made about Professor Young's work.
First, the process he describes is buffeted periodically by random
external shocks (such as the French Revolution), or unpredictable human
behavior; hence, the system is never completely stable and always in
flux. These shocks account for institutional change. However, as Profes-
sor Young demonstrates, some equilibria are more stochastically stable
than others and thus are less likely to change over time.'3 ' Such differ-
ences in stability would explain the persistence of some institutions and
the transience of others.
Second, by "time," Professor Young refers to "event" time, meaning
the number of interactive events that give rise to regular patterns of be-
havior. It is possible, therefore, in some situations to have a large number
of interactive events occurring within a relatively short period of real
time.13 This raises the question whether there is enough event time for
norms to emerge on the international level. Interactions between states
alone may be enough for norms to emerge. In any event, the problem is
ameliorated by the fact that either local or transnational interactions
among sub-state actors may give rise to equilibria that states then use as
the basis for adopting international norms. For example, the practices
that emerge from countless domestic business transactions are used with
some variations in international transactions, in turn giving rise to a set
of practices that might eventually find their way into international trea-
ties.",
Czechoslovakia also were forced to convert during this time. The last continental European
country to switch was Sweden, which did so in 1967.
13 !. See id. at 46-65.
132. Id. at 15-16, 144.
133. The issue of time, however, is a real one, particularly if game theory attempts to
capture more lifelike situations in which there are many players or several options. Suppose,
as John Holland suggests, there is a game with 10 options and 20 moves; the game would have
102" pure strategies. If a computer were capable of testing each strategy every 10-9 seconds, it
would take about 30 centuries to test all possible strategies. JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION
IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS 41-42 (1975). Such considerations lead Professor
Holland to focus on relatively good strategies and means of discovering better ones rather than
a focus on finding the best strategy. See id.
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G. Cooperation Among States as General and Consistent Practices
The realities of international cooperation as reflected in treaties and
the interrelation between customary international law and treaties are
such that there is more "true" cooperation among states that takes cus-
tomary form than first meets the eye. Moreover, there are game theoretic
models that begin to account for such cooperation. This recognition is
important for customary international law because the legitimacy of cus-
tomary law as both an evaluative tool and as a theory of law depends in
part on a rough match between such evaluations and actual state behav-
ior. In my view, such a match exists.
The reason I stress that the match need not be, indeed, cannot be,
any more than a rough one is because of the difference between evalua-
tion and description, between a legal theory and a model of behavior.
The actual practice of states and the game theoretic models I have dis-
cussed suggest that the conditions for cooperation among states are
present. However, is there enough cooperation: do the behavioral regu-
larities that have been described by the models justify a finding of
generality and consistency required of a customary norm? There are at
least two facets to this problem. The first is with respect to frequency-
how often must states observe a practice before it is general and consis-
tent? Again, it is important to note that game theory itself cannot answer
this question. Game theory can model conditions when cooperation
among states may or may not be likely. A legal theory is needed to tell us
how much generality and how much consistency is required before we
can attach legal significance to the patterns of behavior that are observed
among states.
Note what happens, though, if what is described roughly matches its
evaluation. If a behavioral regularity among states is indeed relatively
stable, then it begins to make more sense to speak of departures from
that regularity as violations, provided, of course, that we have a theory of
law which enables us to raise such a regularity to the status of law. Even-
tually, there may be enough endogenous shocks to that behavioral
regularity such that there will be a change in the norm; but until that
time, it becomes appropriate to think about competing behaviors as aber-
rant rather than adaptive.
The second facet concerns the motivations for behavioral regulari-
ties. Putting aside for now the important question of opinio juris, I wish
to examine whether customary international law presupposes a unitary
logic-that behavioral regularities must arise either out of the same con-
texts or out of the interaction of a large number of states. Suppose a state
practice of refraining from attacking coastal fishing vessels emerged, and
observers were able to determine that there were a number of
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explanations for the purported consistency. Some states refrained from
doing so out of coincidence, others were coerced into refraining from
attacking out of fear of retaliation, some found themselves in a repeated
prisoner's dilemma and realized that cooperation was in their respective
best interests, and others were able to coordinate their activities. Suppose
further that all truly cooperative behaviors could be explained through
interactions of pairs of states, not a relatively large number of states. As
long as most states refrained from attack, it is plausible to find as a legal
matter that the behavioral regularity is general and consistent. As long as
there is a practice, it should not matter why it is followed (again leaving
aside the important question of opinio juris, to which I turn next), and
nothing in the standard account of customary international law requires
otherwise. 134
IV. GAME THEORETIC APPROACHES TO THE LAW
AND THE PROBLEM OF OPINIO JURIS
In Part I1, I argued that game theory cannot give a credible account
of the law, and for that reason, there is an important sense in which game
theoretic principles cannot call into question the robustness of a concept
like opiniojuris. At the same time, most commentators acknowledge that
opiniojuris is a concept for which it is difficult to account with any con-
sistency, even though most also acknowledge the need for some concept
that will distinguish behaviors that have legal consequences from those
that do not. 35 If game theory can shed some light on these issues, it
would be for the better. The answer given by Professors Posner and
Goldsmith is that states do not act out of a sense of legal obligation.
Standard game theory does not need a concept of law to explain strategic
behavior among actors: maximization suffices.
Nevertheless, as long as legal consequences attach to behaviors, it is
necessary to distinguish law from mere custom, which opinio juris is
134. Professor Villager also believes that a common practice can emerge for many rea-
sons: "[Slome States engage in a given practice, or make claims, for a wide variety of reasons
(but not erroneously), i.e. alternatively or cumulatively because the conduct or claim is persua-
sive, out of self-interest, for reasons of political pressure, gain, comity, courtesy, etc."
VILLAGER supra note 64, at 53. For him, the important motivation is opiniojuris. See id.
I agree with Professors Goldsmith and Posner, however, that there is a problem of legiti-
macy. Why should one support behaviors that are the result of coercion or coincidence of
interest? For example, most people would doubt the legitimacy of a treaty that was entered
into under threat of war. Yet, as a rule, other forms of behavior, such as economic sanctions
and other diplomatic measures are not prohibited under international law.
135. The jurisprudential basis for legal obligation in international law generally is the
subject of debate. See Charney, supra note 109, at 531-32 (discussing theories of obligation
under international law).
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meant to do.'36 This Part explores other ways in which game theory
might account for the problems raised by opinio juris. I intend to frame
the issues that one must address in responding to the objections raised by
Professors Goldsmith and Posner. I examine the possibility for a game
theoretic account of law and suggest how some of these considerations
could be relevant to accounting for opinio juris. Although opinio juris
continues to be a vexing theoretical problem, recent game theoretic
models of pro-social behaviors consistent with a strong sense of legal
obligation make it too early to conclude that game theory's only account
of opinio juris is that it does not exist.
A. Self-Interest and the Strong Reciprocator
Under standard game theoretical principles, any behavioral regular-
ity in the cases of coincidence of interests, coercion, and even the
cooperation resulting from repeated games, or coordination, can be un-
derstood as self-interested. As Roger Myerson puts it: "[A]ll we really
have to work with in game theory is our assumption that each player is
an intelligent and rational decision-maker, whose behavior is ultimately
derived from the goal of maximizing his own expected utility payoff.'"37
Thus, "we need some model of cooperative behavior that does not aban-
don the individual decision-theoretic foundations of game theory."'3 So,
it is not surprising that in the situations described by Professors Gold-
smith and Posner, a state's decision to cooperate is either ethereal (in the
case of coincidence or coercion) or a rational decision that, given the
circumstances, it is better off cooperating with others than not. By defi-
nition, in standard game theory, all behaviors are so motivated.
Self-interest therefore stands over and against opinio juris as the
competing explanation for state behavior. "In place of opinio juris-the
question-begging and confused talisman that accounts for why nations
'adhere' to [customary international law]-the [rational choice approach,
which builds on game theory,] substitutes the much more familiar and
136. The need to distinguish between behaviors that have legal significance and those
that do not seems to be the only reason for an opinio juris concept. I have never been fully
satisfied with arguments that the reason for following a legal norm is important. As long as I
stop at a red light, it should not matter whether I do so because I think it is good for society,
because I am afraid of getting a ticket or getting into an accident, or because I realize that the
law requires me to do so.
137. MYERSON, supra note 34, at 370. But see SMITH, supra note 102, at vii (arguing that
game theory is better suited to biology in part because "there are good theoretical reasons to
expect [animal] populations to evolve to stable states, whereas there are grounds for doubting
whether human beings always behave rationally.").
138. MYERSON, supra note 34, at 370.
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plausible notion that a nation acts in accordance with its interests and
resources."39 Which is the better way to explain state behavior?
There are several ways to approach this question. In addition to the
distinction between explanation and evaluation discussed in Part 11, an-
other approach is to provide counterfactuals: cases in which it is
plausible to conclude that a state has acted against its interest. For exam-
ple, the case can be made that the United States' decision to abide by the
WTO Appellate Body Report in the Shrimp case was an act of regard for
other states and against self-interest.1 40 The problem with that approach,
however, is that in most cases it is possible to recast the other-regarding
behavior as self-regarding.
If every action can be cast in self-regarding terms, then the central
proposition of standard game theory threatens to become trivial, and
game theory is in danger of losing even its descriptive value. To put it
another way, suppose that decisions can only be understood in terms of
the payoffs to a player and that purportedly other-regarding behavior is
in reality a manifestation of self-regard. Even so, experientially, the dis-
tinction begins to blur.
Law has always taken into account self-interest. Legal rules and self-
interest often overlap. As Mark Villager argues, this represents a strength
of customary international law rather than a weakness. "[A] rule which a
priori meets individual [state] interests constitutes the very best means
of ensuring the rule's application by the [s]tates."' 4' It also strengthens a
law's legitimacy. To use an obvious example, one of the justifications for
federalism is that local government is better able respond to the needs of
the people.' 42 It would be odd to have a law that did not provide some
kind of benefit to those who establish it. One would not expect such a
law to last very long: it either would fall into disuse or be replaced by
another law. Self-interest and legal obligation therefore do not necessar-
ily always conflict.
One must be careful then not to make too much of game theory's
premise of self-interest. This becomes clearer when one moves from
standard game theoretic models to more recent, evolutionary models.
43
There is some evidence that individuals are not as self-regarding as stan-
dard game theory presupposes. As I discussed earlier, Professors
139. Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, supra note 2, at 661.
140. Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, http://www.wto.org, 1998 WL 720123 (W.T.O. Oct. 12, 1998).
141. VILLAGER, supra note 64, at 285.
142. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIs'r No. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (arguing the same).
143. For a discussion of the literature, see GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at
254-58 and Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206 J. THEORETIC BIOL-
OGY 169, 171-72 (2000) [hereinafter Strong Reciprocity].
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Goldsmith and Posner are skeptical that states engaged in an n-person
repeated prisoner's dilemma are likely to cooperate, predominately be-
cause under game theoretic principles, a player is under a strong
temptation to defect irrespective of the cooperative behavior of the other
players. Experiments with two variations of the n-person, repeated pris-
oner's dilemma-the public goods game and the common pool resource
game-indicate that players do not perform as predicted by game theo-
retic models.
In the public goods game, participants are asked to contribute to a
common account in exchange for individual benefits.'" One would ex-
pect that a significant number of players would not contribute to the
store of public goods. However, in reality, in one-stage public goods
games, persons tend to contribute significant amounts to the pool. In re-
peated games, contributions do tend to wane in the middle stages and
dwindle to zero as the game nears its end.' 45 This, however, does not ne-
cessarily mean that the players get it wrong at the beginning and learn
how to play the game over time. 4 6 Instead, the decrease in cooperation
might reflect the only way under the rules of the game that cooperating
players can retaliate against defectors. 47 Retaliation occurs even though
it is against self-interest.
144. Professor Gintis describes a common version of the public goods game: an experi-
menter tells 10 subjects that $1 dollar will be deposited into each of their private accounts for
participating in the game. For every dollar that a participant moves from his private account to
a public account, the experimenter will deposit fifty cents into each participant's public ac-
count after each round. The game is played for 10 rounds, and each participant is allowed to
take home whatever remains in his account. If each person cooperates, during each round,
each of the 10 subjects puts a dollar into the public account, resulting in $10 in the public
account, and the experimenter deposits a total of $5 in each private account. After 10 rounds,
the public account totals $100, and each player takes home $50.
However, a player can come out ahead if he chooses not to cooperate. If one player with-
holds his $1 while all the others contribute, the free rider will end up with $55 and all others
will end up with $45 each. If everyone chooses not to contribute, there is no money in the
public pool, and everyone finishes with $10. If only one person contributes, he will receive $5
while all others will receive $15. The moral of the story from a game theoretic perspective is
that an individual stands to gain the most from not contributing, even if everyone else contrib-
utes. GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 254-55.
145. Id. at 255.
146. Professor Gintis notes that in some experiments, increasing the number of rounds of
play delays the decay in cooperation. Id.
147. Indeed, in other experiments, when subjects are given other means of retaliating,
they use it in a way that preserves cooperation. Id. at 255-56.
Similar cooperation has been observed in experiments with the common pool resource
game. The most famous example is the tragedy of the commons. Under this variation of the n-
person repeated prisoner's dilemma, the players share a common resource such as a pasture.
Each player then hopes that the other players will refrain from overgrazing (cooperating),
while it is in his best interest to overgraze (not cooperate) no matter what the other players do.
The result is overuse of the resource. Experiments with common pool resource games, how-
ever, have resulted in greater cooperation than predicted under the model, particularly when
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One can draw one of two conclusions from the experimental data.
The first is that the players are making mistakes when they play the
game-they are cooperating when they should be defecting; "learning"
is not taking place. The other possibility is that there is something wrong
with the models themselves. Something else is going on that cannot be
captured by a model that presupposes self-interest.1
48
Most game theoretic models of cooperation require a strong possibil-
ity of future interactions among players. As Herbert Gintis points out,
however, a critical weakness of the type of cooperation that arises from
the repeated prisoner's dilemma is that in times of crisis, when coopera-
tion is most needed, the probability that a group will dissolve increases,
thereby reducing the chance of future interaction. "[P]recisely when a
group is most in need of prosocial behavior, cooperation based on recip-
rocal altruism will collapse, since the discount factor then falls to a level
rendering defection an optimal behavior for self-interested agents.',
49
Professor Gintis notes, however, that the experimental data just dis-
cussed suggest the presence in human societies of individuals who
exhibit strong pro-social behaviors that do not arise out of repeated
games.'5° For purposes of this discussion, I focus on what Professor
Gintis calls strong reciprocators. Strong reciprocators are individuals
who cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators even when the
when communication and sanctioning are permitted. Id. at 257. For a more general discussion
of the tragedy of the commons from a game theoretic perspective, see PRAJIT K. DUTTA,
STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 91-102 (2000).
148. The experimental data with respect to individuals should be viewed somewhat skep-
tically. Studies of games involving teams, as opposed to games with individual players, have
shown teams to be less cooperative. See, e.g., Gary Bornstein, David Budescu & Shmuel
Zamir, Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken, 41 J. CON-
FLICT RES. 384 (1997). But even this clannish behavior may have pro-social features. See infra
note 149.
149. Strong Reciprocity, supra note 143, at 172. This kind of reasoning can be found in
international law. One of the reasons that the International Court of Justice could not in the
end rule on the legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in a circumstance
in which a state's very survival was at stake was a state's fundamental right of survival, and
hence, its right of self-defense. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 263 (Advisory Opinion of July 8).
150. See, GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 258-61 (modeling a weak ten-
dency of individuals to reduce inequality when on top and a strong urge to reduce it when on the
bottom); id. at 278-83 (modeling a tendency to "favor members of one's group over members of
other groups at a net material cost to oneself"). Professor Gintis notes that these pro-social
behaviors also are morally ambiguous. "Homo egualis seeks equality, but even at the expense
of pulling down everyone if that hurts the well-off more than himself." Id. at 278. Homo paro-
chius divides the world into insiders and outsiders and differentiates on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, etc. Id.
These kinds of tendencies speak to a kind of relativity in behaviors and exemplify com-
plex human interactions. What is pro-social in one context, such as an individual's regard for a
group, may be anti-social in others, such as when groups interact. Then it becomes a question
of what traits will dominate in any given situation.
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probability of future interactions is low.'"' Such persons have "a propen-
sity to cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at
personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative
and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly, and
even when there are no plausible future rewards or benefits from so be-
having."'52 They are the persons who, in retaliation, will refuse to
contribute to the public goods game when others do not refuse, even
though they are harming themselves.
Such individuals contribute to group fitness vis-a-vis other groups
because their presence helps group members to cooperate even in times
of crisis. They do so by either cooperating even when they lower their
own fitness vis-A-vis others, or by punishing others who defect, even
when such punishment exacts a personal cost. In that sense, the behavior
of a strong reciprocator is optimizing at the group level. In another
sense, however, it is altruistic, because strong reciprocators "increase the
fitness of unrelated individuals at a cost to themselves.' 53 Professor
Gintis shows that the same game theoretic mechanisms that can account
for altruistic behavior among kin can exist among unrelated individuals,
if there is a social process that allows strong reciprocators to interact
with enough frequency.'54 He then goes on to model how a group with a
sufficient number of strong reciprocators would have a fitness advantage
over other groups.'55 In essence, a group that would benefit from contin-
ued cooperation when its existence is at stake would be fitter than a
group that could not maintain its cohesion under similar circum-
stances. 1
56
If Professor Gintis' model is plausible, then it and others like it dem-
onstrate that game theory is no longer bound to the presumption that all
behaviors are self-regarding. To be sure, other-regarding strategies are
still measured against a fitness standard, so that a game theoretic account
of behavior is never completely free from some form of optimization. It
is now possible, however, to articulate a strategy that is not motivated
exclusively by self-interest. Once that door has opened, it becomes
151. Strong Reciprocity, supra note 143, at 172-73. Professor Gintis draws from the work
of Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher A Theory of Reciprocity
(Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 6, 2000).
152. GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 262. For a model of strong reciprocity
in ultimatum games and the prisoner's dilemma, see id. at 261-66.
153. Strong Reciprocity, supra note 143, at 173.
154. GAME THEORY EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 266-71.
155. Id. at 272-78. See also Strong Reciprocity, supra note 143, at 173-77.
156. See Strong Reciprocity, supra note 143. Professor Gintis notes, "Homo reciprocans
is a spontaneous and often unconditional cooperator (ethically positive), but is morally judg-
mental and vindictive (ethically negative, at least according to liberal ethics)." GAME THEORY
EVOLVING, supra note 119, at 278.
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possible to explore whether there are other types of other-regarding
strategies, including ones at higher levels of sophistication that would
begin to share features normally associated with law and a sense of legal
obligation.
B. On the Possibility of a Game Theoretic Account of Law
There are, of course, many steps in the evolution from strong
reciprocity to lawmaking in societies, and from there to lawmaking on
the international level. 57 There are at least two general ways in which
game theory might attempt to account for law. One way is to view the
law as an external constraint on the particular game that is being played.
For example, the law might be seen as affecting the payoffs of a particu-
lar game. The task then is to see how rational players would respond to
the particular legal constraint. Note, however, that in such an approach,
game theory does not really explain law as such. Law is already assumed
by the game; the game itself and the strategies that might be pursued in
that game say nothing about the validity or normative force of the law
itself, only how the law affects play.
The second way for game theory to account for law is to view law
and/or lawmaking as part of the possible set of strategies that players can
adopt, that is, as internal to the game. Because law and lawmaking are
such complex phenomena, it may be that game theory may never be able
to give this kind of explanation. Thus, it is helpful to narrow the issues
by identifying at least some of the features commonly associated with
157. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to discuss Fernando Tes6n's attempt to
cast opiniojuris in game theoretic terms. He is ultimately critical of game theory's ability to
account for international law. Professor Tes6n suggests that opiniojuris is used as a persuasive
device by states who are trying to convince newly emerging states or states that have under-
gone changes in leadership to follow established norms. He argues, as I have, that state
practice can be understood as a set of behaviors that arise out of repeated prisoner's dilemma
and coordination problems. TEs6N, supra note 3, at 86. Opiniojuris arises when new states
emerge. He argues that "a repeated pattern of behavior becomes a norm when the participants
in the practice wish to channel the behavior of newcomers." Id. (footnote omitted). When such
newcomers emerge, it is unclear whether they will conform to that practice. Thus, "[b]y de-
scribing the regularity now to newcomers as a binding customary norm, the incumbents
attempt to secure the cooperation of new states." Id. (emphasis in original). In Professor
Tes6n's view, this also happens with changes in governments of already existing states, which
need to be persuaded to continue existing cooperation. Id.
I do not doubt that existing states encourage emerging states and new governments to ad-
here to norms by arguing that they are legally binding. However, opiniojuris in concept tries
to be more than a persuasive and legitimizing device-it is also a means of distinguishing
legally binding norms from non-legally binding norms. Presumably, older states would prefer
emerging states to adhere to at least some of the non-legally binding customs that are a part of
international diplomacy. They must therefore have some way of distinguishing between the
two-if only to decide when it is appropriate to use opiniojuris as a persuasive tool. We must
look elsewhere for a satisfactory account of a sense of legal obligation.
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legal obligation and a sense of obligation. Of course, legal obligation is
only one of the many concepts associated with law, and legal obligation
is itself complex. Even so focused, it may still be beyond the reach of
game theory to model those minimum requirements. At best models may
address only one or at most two or three of the important features of ob-
ligation. What might some of those features be?
Three themes can be used to further this discussion: 1) the emer-
gence of stable behavioral regularities, either through the standard
accounts of the repeated prisoner's dilemma or through more sophisti-
cated models, either evolutionary or dynamic or both; 2) game theory can
explain why it is beneficial for a person to conform to a norm, but it can-
not explain a strong sense of legal obligation;' 3) the strong
reciprocator-someone who will cooperate or punish behavior without
regard to self-interest-is necessary to ensure cooperation in extreme
situations when most people would prefer to defect.
In times of crisis, a strong reciprocator will use force against a per-
son whom he believed was in danger of defecting. The actions of the
strong reciprocator could be so harsh that they become counterproduc-
tive: once a crisis has passed, people remember the threats and actions of
the strong reciprocator and wreak their own revenge, which in turn
threatens internal cohesion. Consider the following hypothesis: among
its many functions, law replaces and is in some ways, an improvement,
over the strong reciprocator. Societies use law and legal obligation to
force persons to cooperate when they would prefer to defect. Law be-
comes the glue that holds a society together in times of crisis. At the
same time, law spares defectors from the strong reciprocator's potential
harshness.5 9 Thus, despite the ability under customary international law
to act in self-defense in the event of an armed attack, a state is restrained
by the principle of necessity and proportionality. Its response must be
necessary to its self-defense and proportional to the severity of the initial
attack.
It follows that to act out of a sense of legal obligation is (from the
perspective of a potential defector) to understand that to deviate from a
158. For Professor Tes6n, legal obligation implies that a person will conform to a legal
norm even when it is not in his or her interest to do so. Although, as I have discussed earlier,
there is a close relationship between self-interest and legal norms and law often reflects self-
interest, let us assume that Professor Tes6n's view of legal obligation is right.
159. Law encourages, but at the same time tempers, pro-social behaviors, including
strong reciprocity, the drive towards equality, and the tendency to treat other group members
more favorably than outsiders, even at personal expense. See supra note 150. As this Article
was being readied for publication, Theodore Seto published an article in which he makes a
similar argument that law tempers the effects of harsh reciprocity. See Theodore P. Seto, Inter-
generational Decision Making: an Evolutionary Perspective, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 235, 253-
54 (2001). Time does not allow me to fully assess Professor Seto's argument.
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norm is to open one's self to possible sanctions. However, such sanctions
are justified only when there is such deviation, and are not unlimited in
scope. The state that engages in an armed attack can expect retaliation,
but not complete annihilation. From the perspective of the strong
reciprocator, who can be either an individual or in more complex socie-
ties, an institution, it is to understand that one can "punish" defections,
but can only go so far.
Recall Professor Young's discussion of the bottom up emergence of
the right-hand driving convention in Europe.'6° Inasmuch as successful
strategies, like law, emerge from the interactions of agents within less
complex social groups, one would expect people to try to replicate such
strategies at the international level. It may be that such a strategy is ves-
tigial at the international level, or it may be a strong basin of attraction
that is gradually emerging from the large number of international inter-
actions among international actors. International law, however, would
nevertheless be based on strategies that at times require a member to co-
operate when it would prefer to defect, thus meeting Professor Tes6n's
criteria for true legal obligation. The possible emergence of such adap-
tive strategies at the international level make it too early to conclude that
states never act out of a sense of legal obligation, even from a game
theoretic perspective.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Professors Goldsmith and Posner point out that a new theory is
worthwhile if it carries with it the possibility of greater insight into pre-
viously little understood phenomena and opens up avenues for further
inquiry and debate. Even though this Article has been somewhat critical
of the conclusions that they have drawn from their theory, it should not
be taken to minimize the contribution that has been made by their two
articles. By asking readers to apply game theoretical concepts to the
sources of international law, Professors Goldsmith and Posner use a dis-
cipline that, in its more modern forms, holds the possibility of describing
in a rigorous way the interactions of individuals and states. This ap-
proach reaches far beyond the province of international law. In the future
it may be possible to describe, through more advanced forms of game
theory, the emergence of and potential disappearance of states, as well as
what gives rise to law itself.
Of course, the legal community has heard these kinds of claims be-
fore and is thus justified if it is skeptical. Game theory is itself
160. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
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undergoing change and many important questions are yet to be an-
swered. The following areas need further research and development
before scholars arrive at a truly robust theory.
More theoretical work needs to be done to model adaptive strategies
that lead to the development of law and the other institutions that support
it. It is unclear whether such a theory is possible. Game theoretic models
of such institutions, let alone lawmaking, require a level of sophistication
that has yet to be reached. As Professor Young puts it, however, "U]ust as
perfect spheres and frictionless planes are idealized but useful concepts
for modeling mechanical interactions, we can view games and learning
rules as primitives for modeling social and economic interactions." 6 '
Significant progress in game theoretic accounts of institutions would
only be a first step in accounting for law. Here, I have suggested that law
performs the pro-social functions typically performed by the strong re-
ciprocator but ameliorates its harshness. In addition, game theoreticians
have begun to describe other types of pro-social behavior, each of which,
however, have certain negative aspects. It would be helpful to see
whether law plays a role in both enhancing and ameliorating the effects
of those pro-social behaviors.
Experimental game theory has made a valuable contribution to the
field because it has yielded results not predicted by the standard theory,
which in turn has led in some instances to a re-evaluation of that theory.
Of course, experimental game theory is limited when it comes to states.
It is unlikely, for example, that foreign-policymakers would be willing to
play the ultimatum game under experimental conditions, and even if they
were, it is unclear what would be learned about how states act in real
strategic situations. Thus, research is required to determine what can be
extrapolated from simulations or other proxies for actual state behav-
ior.162
The potential difficulties in designing experiments for international
actors highlight the need for further historical research. Professors Gold-
smith and Posner have made a serious attempt at determining whether
the record of actual state behavior in a number of areas is consistent with
their theory of behavioral regularities among states. More empirical re-
search is needed to confirm that patterns of self-interested behavior are
indeed present, as well as to discover other evidence of such patterns. If
my arguments here are valid, there must be evidence of cooperation
161. YOUNG, supra note 119, at 149.
162. Some experimental work has been done with political decisionmakers. See, e.g.,
Erique Fatis & Pilar Tamborero, The Subject Pool Conjecture: Politicians and Rationality
Failures in Simple Political Experiments (Laboratory for Research in Experimental Econom-
ics Working Paper No. 21/00, 2000) (testing whether there are differences in the behavior of
politicians and non-experienced subjects in making political choices).
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among states that would arise even in situations where, under standard
game theory, states would prefer to defect. I have alluded to possible
examples of such cooperation, but such illustrations must be more fully
fleshed out.
Many of the advances in modern game theory, particularly in its dy-
namic form, have been possible only with computer simulations and
modeling. Computer simulations are beginning to appear in legal schol-
arship. Randal Picker has used such simulations to better understand
how norms might spread through a given population.' 63 David Post and
Michael Eisen have used computer simulations to argue that legal rea-
soning itself might be fractal in nature.'" Since actual experiments with
states seem highly unlikely, computer simulations could be used to ver-
ify "in silico" the theoretical work that must be done to explain state
behavior.
Finally, there are any number of issues that are specific to interna-
tional law. More work needs to be done from a game theoretic
perspective about the attempt of states to govern their relationships
through law. If it is true that law replaces the strong reciprocator and that
states have attempted to replicate what has worked for them at lower or-
ganizational levels, it must be determined whether this effect is vestigial
or whether it is still robust.
In addition, I have approached the problem as if the only relevant ac-
tors on the international scene are states. Although states will continue to
play an important, and perhaps primary, role in the ordering of interna-
tional relations, the number of international actors has grown to include
a multitude of non-governmental organizations, governmental sub-units,
large business enterprises, and in some cases, individuals. One could
account for these players by assuming that their actions, insofar as they
affect states, are the kinds of external shocks that Professor Young de-
scribes in his best-reply model. It may be that because states continue to
hold a monopoly over the machinery that recognizes and creates interna-
tional law, such a model would be appropriate. The interaction of other
international actors, however, may lead to the equilibria that states codify
either in treaty form or what is eventually recognized to be a customary
norm. Thus, a more accurate model would be one that makes the activi-
ties of such actors internal to the game.
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CONCLUSIONS
Professors Goldsmith and Posner offer a game theoretic alternative
to the positivist account of customary international law. Instead of a set
of general and consistent practices, there are behavioral regularities that
tend to arise from coincidence of interest and coercion, and sometimes
from the repeated interactions of states. In no case, however, do states
purely act out of a sense of legal obligation.
I have tried to show that in theory there are enough stable forms of
"true" cooperation that they could serve as the basis for general and con-
sistent practices. And, although the concept of opinio juris continues to
pose difficulties, it is too early in game theory's development to conclude
that it does not exist. Still, I agree with Professors Goldsmith and Posner
that game theory, particularly in its more sophisticated forms, opens new
avenues for exploration regarding the behavior of states, including the
making of international law, both in its customary and treaty forms.
